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A SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT OF
INFERRED INTENTIONS: MATSUSHITA
ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO. v. UNITED
STATES
Antidumping laws are intended to limit the anticompetitive
effects of imported goods sold in the United States at a price lower
than their domestic price.' The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 2
See 1 P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 18.03[4], at 18-11
(1984); W. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 1 (1977).
The purpose of antidumping laws is to prevent discrimination in the pricing habits of mul-
tinational corporations. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100, 1324 & n.391 (E.D. Pa. 1981); 1 P. FELLER, supra, § 18.03[4], at 18-11; W. WARES,
supra, at 1. The United States antidumping statutes are designed to impose a duty on
dumped imports to "equalize competitive conditions," rather than to inflict a penalty. 1 R.
STURM, CusToMs LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, Booklet 17, § 48.1(a), at 2 (1983); see J.C. Pen-
ney Co. v. United States Treasury Dep't, 439 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Flintkote Co. v. Blumenthal, 469 F. Supp. 115, 118 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 596 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1979). But cf. Almstedt, International Price Discrimination and the 1916 Antidumping
Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 772-73 (1981) (proposing
treble damage civil penalty for violations of antidumping laws).
Americans first expressed a desire for protection of domestic industry from unfair for-
eign competition at the end of World War I, when it was feared that a European dumping
conspiracy would inundate the United States with inexpensive goods. See W. WARES, supra,
at 21; Almstedt, supra, at 751. Although American commercial policy has evolved toward
trade liberalization, the antidumping statutes remain essentially protectionist. See W.
WARES, supra, at 21-22; Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping
Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1079
(1981); see also Television Receiving Sets from Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,702, 32,704 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as ITC Investigation] ("plain" that antidumping legislation intended to
protect domestic industry). Recently, antidumping laws have assumed greater importance in
American international trade policy. HOUSE CoMu. ON THE JUDICIARY, CUSTOMS COURTS ACT
OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3729, 3730.
Although dumping has existed since the seventeenth century, antidumping laws were
used infrequently. Note, supra, at 1076; see Coudert, The Application of the United States
Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 217
(1965). Recently, however, the international community has turned its attention to regulat-
ing the problems of dumping. Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437, 450 (1981); see, e.g., Agreement on Implementa-
tion of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done June 30, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (International Antidumping Code) [hereinafter Agreement
on the Implementation of GATT].
2 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of titles 5, 13, 19, 26, and 28 of the United States Code). The Trade
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authorizes the issuance of an antidumping duty order upon a find-
ing by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of price dis-
parity and a finding by the International Trade Commission (ITC
or Commission) of an actual or potential threat of material injury
to United States industry.3 These orders impose upon specific
Agreements Act of 1979 (the Act) is consistent with many of the requirements of the Agree-
ment on the Implementation of GATT, supra note 1. See Ribicoff, The U.S. Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 3, 3 (1982); Note, supra note 1, at 1082; see also
19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982) (Congress' qualified acceptance of the Agreement on the Implemen-
tation of GATT, supra note 1). One of the major concessions made by the United States in
the Agreement on the Implementation of GATT, supra note 1, is the addition of materiality
to the injury requirement. Note, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping Agreement and
the Trade Agreements Act, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1421 (1979). But see 1 P.
FELLER, supra note 1, § 18.06[3], at 18-28 (addition of "material" did not change United
States law).
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 superseded the Antidumping Act of 1921. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-171 (1976), repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a),
93 Stat. 144, 193. Substantively, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is the same as the An-
tidumping Act of 1921, the distinctions in the 1979 legislation being essentially a codifica-
tion of previous practices. Note, supra note 1, at 1106; see 1 P. FELLER, supra note 1, §
18.01, at 18-3. See generally 1 P. FELLER, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 18-52.2 to -65 (chart
comparing Trade Agreements Act of 1979 with Antidumping Act of 1921). Consequently,
cases decided under the 1921 statute provide "authoritative guidance for interpreting the
new law." Id. § 18.01, at 18-3. Therefore, this Comment will employ pre-1979 adjudications
for a proper interpretation of problems posed by the Trade Agreements Act.
3 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). This statute provides:
If-
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign mer-
chandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury,
or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materi-
ally retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the
amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price for the merchandise.
Id.
The administering authority referred to in subsection 1 is the International Trade Ad-
ministration (ITA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, and the Commission re-
ferred to in subsection 2 is the International Trade Commission (ITC). See Caine, A Case
for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 681, 684 (1981). Responsibility for the administration of the antidumping proceedings,
originally vested in the Department of the Treasury and -the Tariff Commission, was
changed pursuant to an Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273,
69,274 (1979).
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goods a duty equal to the difference between the domestic price
and the price in the United States.4 Administrative review of an
antidumping duty order may be granted by the ITC upon a show-
ing of sufficiently changed circumstances.6 While the findings of
the ITC must be supported by substantial evidence," the standards
of proof governing ITC review had never been addressed by a re-
viewing court.7 Recently, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
' 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
Id. § 1675(b). Section 1675 provides, inter alia, that either the ITA or the ITC may
conduct a review of an affirmative antidumping determination if such agency receives a re-
quest showing "changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review." Id. The agency must
first publish notice of the review in the Federal Register and may not review an affirmative
antidumping order, absent "good cause," until 2 years after publication of the original order.
Id. This review may be appealed to the Court of International Trade. Id. § 1516a(2).
0 Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B). Substantial evidence is "evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S.
607, 620 (1966) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Arm-
strong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 312, 327 (Cust. Ct.), aff'd, 626 F.2d 168
(C.C.P.A. 1980). A substantial evidence test requires less evidence than a preponderance of
the evidence test. The fact that two inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the same
evidence is not sufficient to prevent an agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence. Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (citing NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S.
105, 106 (1942)); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir. 1960).
The record for the judicial review of administrative antidumping proceedings shall con-
sist of "a copy of all information presented to or obtained by" the agency whose determina-
tion is being reviewed. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982). The court is to proceed accord-
ing to the record as prepared by the agency, and may not embark upon a de novo trial. S.
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
381, 637; 1 R. STURM, supra note 1, § 47.5(b), at 62 (Supp. 1980); Vance, Judicial Review of
Antidumping Orders in the United States and European Economic Community, 26 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 577, 589 (1981). See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1154 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (general discussion of the availability of de
novo review in actions commenced in the Customs Court). Similarly, a review of a final
countervailing duty order must proceed only on the administrative record. Ceramica Regi-
omontana, S.A. v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 593, 595 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
A reviewing court, though authorized to consider carefully the "relevant factors," may
not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994
(C.C.P.A. 1972). The court's inquiry is limited to the determination whether the Commis-
sion's conclusion had a "rational basis in fact and was not contrary to law." Pasco Termi-
nals, Inc. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 201, 220 (Cust. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 634 F.2d 610
(C.C.P.A. 1980); see Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1933); SCM
Corp. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 159, 161 (1978); F.W. Myers & Co. v. United States, 376
F. Supp. 860, 878 (Cust. Ct. 1974). The foundation for this administrative deference is the
broad discretionary authority accorded the ITC by Congress. See Pasco Terminals, 477 F.
Supp. at 220; infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
7 See United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently characterized the procedures of an antidumping
review proceeding as "novel and unfamiliar .... casting everyone ... in novel and unfamil-
iar roles." Id.
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United States,8 the Court of International Trade reversed an an-
tidumping duty order, holding that the review of the order by the
ITC was not conducted in accordance with proper standards of
proof and that the refusal by the ITC to lift the order was not
supported by substantial evidence. 9
In 1971, the Tariff Commission ° found that a United States
industry was being injured by the sale of television receiving sets
from Japan at less than their fair value." Ten years after the issu-
ance of an antidumping duty order, the affected importers initi-
ated a changed circumstances review of the finding of material in-
jury to the television industry in the United States.2 Upholding
the injury determination, 13 the ITC concluded that the American
industry remained sufficiently weak 4 and, therefore, it would be
injured further if the Japanese manufacturers were encouraged to
Allowing judicial review of decisions of the ITA and of the ITC is consonant with the
general rule that agency adjudications, whether affirmative or negative, are judicially review-
able. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57
(1970); SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (Cust. Ct. 1978) (citing Dunlop
v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975)). The Court of International Trade is granted juris-
diction over actions involving United States customs laws by § 1581 of the Customs Courts
Act of 1980. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982). The Customs Courts Act grants the Court of Interna-
tional Trade the same powers in law and equity as a United States district court. Id. § 1585.
8 569 F. Supp. 853 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
9 Id. at 864.
'0 The Tariff Commission was renamed the United States International Trade Commis-
sion in 1979 by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (1975) (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1982)).
" Television Receiving Sets from Japan, 36 Fed. Reg. 4576, 4576 (1971). The original
determination of sales below fair value was made by the Department of the Treasury in
1970. Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, from Japan, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,549,
18,549 (1970).
2 ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,702. The ITA, rather than the ITC, is the
proper forum to conduct a changed circumstances review of a determination of sales at less
than fair value. Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 856. Bypassing the ITA, the importers sought
review by the ITC of the material injury finding. Id. Therefore, the continued sale of the
television sets at less than fair value was assumed. Id.
The ITC characterized the purpose of their review as a determination:
"whether an industry in the United States would be materially injured, or would
be threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the
United States would be materially retarded, by reason of imports of the merchan-
dise covered by the . . . antidumping order if the order were to be modified or
revoked."
ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,702 n.1 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 207.45a(2) (1982)).
:3 ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,703.
1 Id. The ITC concluded that the United States television industry was: (1) highly
competitive, (2) extremely price sensitive, and (3) minimally profitable. Id. Thus, although
conditions had changed sufficiently to warrant a review of the antidumping duty, id. at
32,704, the ITC concluded that there was still a threat of material injury, id. at 32,703.
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increase their levels of importation. 15
The proponents of revocation of the duty 6 then sought review
by the Court of International Trade. 7 Examining the record for
substantial evidence to support the ITC decision,'8 the Court de-
termined that the findings of the ITC were based on the prediction
that the Japanese imports would increase dramatically if the an-
tidumping duty was either modified or revoked. 19 This prediction,
the Court concluded, was not supported by substantial evidence.20
Writing for the Court, Judge Watson recognized that the in-
tentions of the party against whom the order has been issued are
relevant to the determination of the reviewing commission.2' The
Court posited, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the interpretation given by the ITC of the importer's inten-
tions.2 Judge Watson determined that by requiring the foreign
manufacturers to come forward with evidence, the ITC was impos-
ing a presumption in favor of the continuing validity of the order.23
This procedure, the Court held, violated the rule that there is no
burden of proof on a party during an ITC investigation.24 In the
1" Id. at 32,706. The ITC scrutinized the Japanese manufacturers' production capabili-
ties to predict their reaction to a revocation of the antidumping duty. Id. The Commission
determined that the manufacturers could adapt their production facilities to meet an in-
creased demand on short notice. Id. From this finding the ITC inferred the exporters' intent
to increase the levels of exportation upon a lifting of the duty. Id.
18 See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 855 n.4. The proponents of revocation, who were the
petitioners in the Court of International Trade, were major television exporters. Id.
17 Id. at 855-56. This review was taken pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii)
(1982). Id.
:S 569 F. Supp. at 855-56; see supra note 6.
I9 569 F. Supp. at 857. The court found that the three reasons given by the ITC in
support of their prediction of an increase of Japanese imports were unsupported by substan-
tial evidence. Id. The reasons given by the ITC were: (1) the importers' present intentions,
(2) the manufacturers' production capacity, and (3) the incentives that would guide the fu-
ture conduct of the importers and the manufacturers. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. (citing City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972)). The
City Lumber court held that when a statute contemplates the probability of future events, it
is "perfectly legitimate" to consider intent. City Lumber, 457 F.2d at 997.
22 569 F. Supp. at 860.
213 Id. at 858-59.
24 Id. at 858. According to the Court, the only burden of proof imposed on the party
seeking review is to demonstrate a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant the review.
Id. Once review is granted, however, "the only burden on a party is the burden of cooperat-
ing with the investigation of the administrative agency." Id. The ITC has a duty to investi-
gate both neutrally, id. at 860, and thoroughly, Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 997, 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
In Budd Co., the plaintiff, a domestic manufacturer of railway cars and parts, brought
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absence of substantial evidence, and unaided by a presumption
showing a continuing threat of injury to American industry, Judge
Watson concluded that there was no longer a threat of injury.25
The Court therefore ordered the reversal of the injury determina-
tion and revoked the antidumping duty order.26
In Matsushita, the Court of International Trade applied the
standard of substantial evidence to the ITC material injury inves-
tigation. It is submitted, however, that the Court transgressed the
bounds of judicial scrutiny by "weighing the evidence." This Com-
ment will consider the novelty of the current antidumping statu-
tory scheme, 28 analyze the impact of the Court's decision on ITC
review procedures, and suggest an approach more consistent with
the goals of the antidumping laws.
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENTS AND IMBERT IMPORTS
In granting the Court of International Trade the authority to
hold unlawful only those ITC determinations that are unsupported
by substantial evidence, 29 Congress revealed an intent both to pro-
mote the uniform application of laws and to grant the proper
amount of respect to agency expertise.3 ° Although, as a general
an action before the Court of International Trade seeking review of an ITC determination of
no material injury to the domestic industry by sales of cars and parts from Japan and Italy
to three American transit systems. Budd Co., 507 F. Supp. at 998-99. Although upholding
the finding of the ITC of no material injury due to the importation of finished railway cars,
the Court addressed, on its own initiative, the issue of the impact on the domestic industry
of the importation of component parts. Id. at 1002-03. The Court concluded that little at-
tention had been paid to this issue by the parties and, moreover, the Court found a lack of
diligence on the part of the Commission in fulfilling its investigative duties. Id. Because the
Commission in Budd Co. breached this obligation, id. at 1006, the Court remanded the case
to the ITC for reconsideration, id. at 1006-07. It has been suggested, however, that the
Court's sua sponte "aggressive judicial review" will increase the time spent in litigation,
thereby frustrating the intent of Congress to expedite the process in dumping claims. See
Note, Administering the Revised Antidumping Law: Allocating Power between the ITC
and the Court of International Trade, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 883, 900 (1982).
2 Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 864.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 860; see 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1)(B) (1982).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 established new procedures for review, which the courts and
the administrative agencies involved will have to "learn by doing." Id.; cf. Vance, supra note
6, at 587-89 (outlining steps necessary to seek review under new system).
29 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982); see supra note 6.
'0 See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); Stason, "Sub-
stantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1029 (1941); S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 637. The
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principle of administrative law, a reviewing court is authorized to
consider all the "relevant factors" contained in the record,31 the
court may neither substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency3l nor weigh the evidence.33 In the review of an ITC deter-
mination, the substantial evidence test is satisfied if a reasonable
relationship exists between the importers' challenged activity and
the purported injury to domestic industry.34 The Matsushita Court
found that there was insufficient evidence to support the determi-
nation of the ITC that television importers would increase their
levels of importation upon the cessation of the antidumping du-
ties." It is submitted that the manner in which the Court consid-
ered the findings of the ITC violated the prohibitions against sub-
stituted judgment and weighing the evidence.
Despite the difficulties involved in accurately predicting a
substantial evidence test requires that the findings of the agency bear a reasonable, direct
relationship to the presented evidence, Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 676,
682 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), thus freeing the reviewing court from the demanding burden of
weighing the evidence, Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620.
31 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 204, at 579-81 (1976). The reviewing court may consider
only the relevant factors as found in the administrative record. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at
416; supra note 6. Therefore, the freedom to review the relevant factors does not operate as
a license to conduct a trial de novo. See SCM Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 96, 108
(Cust. Ct. 1980); supra note 6.
3 United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)) (even if agency has acted illegally, a Court of Interna-
tional Trade judge may only remand for a proper consideration, he may not impose his own
opinion); Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 201, 220 (Cust. Ct. 1979)
(because Commission given a discretionary function the court should not impose its judg-
ment), aft'd, 634 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980); Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 335
(C.C.P.A. 1933) (under Antidumping Act of 1921, court may not examine the validity of the
Treasury Secretary's conclusions as long as he has abided by proper procedure); cf. Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (under Administrative
Procedure Act, even though court may consider the factors underlying the secretary's judg-
ment, "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency").
3 See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Sprague
Elec. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 676, 682-83 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981); F.W. Myers &
Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 860, 878 (Cust. Ct. 1974).
" See Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
substantial evidence test, as applied to causation, requires only that there be a "causative
link" between the less-than-fair-value sales and the injury. Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United
States, 477 F. Supp. 201, 220 (Cust. Ct. 1979), af'd, 634 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see
Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 676, 682 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). One com-
mentator has expressed the opinion that the causal link is established by a mere "identifi-
able relationship." Note, supra note 1, at 1102-03.
" Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 857.
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party's intentions,36 ITC investigations may demand such fore-
sight.37 Due to the unavailability of the exporters and importers for
testimony," the ITC based its predictions of intentions on the pro-
duction capabilities of the foreign manufacturers.3 9 The ITC stated
that the production capabilities were adequately flexible to in-
crease production, and therefore exportation, quickly. 0 In holding
that this was an insubstantial predicate for the finding of material
31 See ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,707. The dissenting ITC Commissioner
questioned the availability of reliable evidence to prove intentions. Id. at 32,712 (Stern,
Comm'r, dissenting). She asserted that, even had they testified, the petitioners' statements
concerning their intentions would be "self-serving and unprovable." Id. (Stern, Comm'r,
dissenting).
37 See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 857. One court has characterized intent as a "per-
fectly legitimate matter" for the Commission to consider. City Lumber Co. v. United States,
457 F.2d 991, 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972). The regulations for the ITC implicitly recognize the ne-
cessity of considering intent because the investigation is based on a prediction of what
would happen to the domestic industry "if the order were to be modified or revoked." 19
C.F.R. § 207.45(a) (1984) (emphasis added).
38 See ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,705-06. The ITC majority opinion stated
that there were no "supplementary submissions" offered by the exporters and the importers
regarding their future intentions. Id. at 32,706. Nevertheless, the majority noted that the
submissions had not been specifically requested by the ITC. Id.
The Court of International Trade criticized the ITC for this inactivity. Matushita, 569
F. Supp. at 857-58. This lack of diligent effort was asserted to be a breach of the duty of the
ITC to investigate thoroughly. Id. at 860. But see ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706
n.12 (it is not "reasonable to expect the Commission to make a petitioner's case for it");
Ribicoff, supra note 2, at 8 (ITC proceedings are adversarial and parties cannot expect ITC
to develop facts on its own). The ITC must reasonably seek all "available" information,
which has been defined as all evidence that is "'accessible or may be obtained, from
whatever its source.'" Freres v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 599, 604 n.8 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (quoting Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 997, 1003-04 (Ct Int'l
Trade 1980)). Due to the failure of the ITC to request sufficient information, it is submitted
that the Court of International Trade should have remanded the case to the ITC to allow a
full investigation.
39 ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706.
1o Id. The ITC proposed three scenarios to illustrate that resumed dumping by the
Japanese television importers could materially injure domestic industry. Id. The first scena-
rio contemplated the Japanese importers responding to a high level of consumer demand by
increasing their market share while unilaterally suppressing what would otherwise be a pe-
riod of increasing prices for domestic producers. Id. The second possibility was that the
Japanese importers would use Japanese-made television sets to supplement the Japanese-
owned, American-built television sets during periods of short-term cyclical increases in de-
mand. Id. The final scenario concerned the Japanese-built picture tube. The ITC indicated
that if demand for this component continued to drop in other major overseas markets, the
Japanese importers might wish to use the American market, thereby interfering with the
market for American-made picture tubes. Id. The Court of International Trade character-
ized these scenarios as "virtual assumption[s]," "inconsistent," and "conjectural," respec-
tively. 569 F. Supp. at 861-62 & n.25.
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injury, 41 it is suggested that the Court of International Trade dis-
regarded the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals42 in Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States.43
In Imbert Imports, an importer appealed a Customs Court de-
cision upholding an imposition of dumping duties.44 The importer
claimed that the Court acted improperly in basing a finding of
probable injury on the production capacity of the foreign pro-
ducer, 45 a finding similar to that of the ITC in Matsushita.46 In
affirming the decision of the Customs Court,47 the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals declined to consider the importer's argu-
ment because it would have required the court to "weigh and bal-
ance the evidence. '4 It is submitted that an examination of the
Matsushita rationale in light of the holding in Imbert Imports es-
tablishes that the Matsushita Court improperly weighed the evi-
dence and substituted its opinion for the judgment of the ITC. By
deciding the case on the merits, the Court contravened prece-
dent.49 The more appropriate procedure would have been for the
4, Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 860.
11 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which handled appeals from the Court of
International Trade, was renamed the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25, 25 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1982)).
'3 475 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1192.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
'7 475 F.2d at 1192.
" Id. The Imbert Imports court declined to entertain an argument that the Commis-
sion's decision was arbitrary, while the Matsushita Court based its decision on such a deter-
mination. Compare id. (considering whether the Commission's determination of the pro-
ducer's capacity is too speculative would be an exercise in weighing the evidence) with
Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 860 ("evidence ... of production capacity... has been ana-
lyzed by the Court") (emphasis added).
"9 See United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(3) (1982). In Roses, the Court
of International Trade overturned an ITC ruling and ordered the commencement of an in-
vestigation. 706 F.2d at 1565. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, stating
that as a "general rule," it is an abuse of authority for the Court of International Trade to
substitute its judgment "instead of remanding the case for agency determination according
to correct procedures." Id. at 1569 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)); cf.
United States Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports v. United States, 563 F. Supp.
838, 842 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (court has no jurisdiction to "guide" determination of the
International Trade Administration; its function is limited to the review of agency conclu-
sions). The "trend" is for the Court to find the investigation of the ITC insufficient and to
remand the case to the ITC. 1 R. STURM, supra note 1, § 48.3(b), at 33; see, e.g., Roses, 706
F.2d at 1569; Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 997, 1006-07 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1980); see also Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 1142, 1143 (Ct. Int'l
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Court to remand the case to the ITC for further findings." Even if
the ITC had made material mistakes, the Court of International
Trade would have no authority to "tak[e] out of their hands the
decision that is still for them to make."'51 Furthermore, it is sug-
gested that the Matsushita Court's discussion of the evidentiary
principles applicable to an ITC hearing places an undue burden on
"protected" American industry.
THE "SHIFTING" BURDEN OF PROOF
Both the ITC and the Court of International Trade asserted
that there is no express burden of proof on a party involved in a
changed circumstances review of an injury determination.2 The
ITC concluded, however, that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary there would be a finding of an intent to increase imports
if the antidumping duty order were lifted.53 This language led the
Matsushita Court to find that the ITC created a presumption
against the proponents of revocation." Due to the inconsistent dis-
cussion concerning this issue55 and the recognition that, even when
no proof is presented, the ITC will reach a determination on the
merits, further exposition is warranted.
Even assuming, as the ITC and the Matsushita Court have
suggested, that there is no affirmative burden of proof on either
party at an ITC review hearing, 56 the existence of such a burden is
implicit in the realization that, in the absence of evidence, it is the
losing party that bore the burden.5" Concededly, the ITC may have
placed a burden of proof on the foreign importers.58 Although the
Trade 1983) (court remanded case to the ITC three times).
50 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1 United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). By not remanding
the case, it is submitted that the court substituted its judgment for that of the ITC. See
supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
52 See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 860; ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706 n.12.
51 ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,703.
54 See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 858.
5 Compare id. (ITC placed a burden of proof on the proponents of revocation) with
ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706 n.12 (ITC did not impose a burden of proof).
" See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 860; ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706 n.12.
'7 See, e.g., W. RICHARDSON, OUTLINES OF EVIDENCE 102 (1911); 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2487, at 279
(3d ed. 1940). Evidentiary standards require that when the evidence is in "equilibrium, the
jury must find against [the party that bore the burden]." W. RICHARDSON, supra, at 102
(quoting L. HAMMON, HAMMON ON EVIDENCE § 2, at 4 (1907)).
"I See ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,706 & n.12. Despite a denial of the exis-
[Vol. 58:877
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Court purported to remove that burden and create a situation
where no burden of proof exists, 9 it is suggested that the judicial
resolution of the matter merely shifted the burden to the protected
American industry. In accordance with basic rules of evidence and
the protective intent of the antidumping laws, it is submitted that
the burden of proof implicit in the review hearing should be placed
on the party arguing for a change in the status quo.
When there is no evidence to the contrary, rules of evidence
require a court to presume the continued existence of a proven
fact.60 In addition, an adverse inference may be drawn against a
party that fails to produce evidence exclusively within its dominion
and control.61 In Matsushita, there was little, if any, credible evi-
dence tending to show a change in the initial material injury find-
ing.6 2 Evidence tending to rebut the injury finding was clearly
within the exclusive control of the foreign manufacturers6 3 and,
yet, it was unproduced. It is argued that when the proponents of
the revocation of an antidumping duty order fail to rebut the once-
tence of a burden of proof, id., the reliance of the ITC on a presumption that the plaintiffs
would increase imports if the order were revoked effectively served as a burden of proof, see
Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 858.
' See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 860.
'0 Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982); Rivas v. Weinberger, 475
F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1973); L. HAMMON, supra note 57, § 34, at 145. If the existence of a
state of affairs has been proved, and there is no contradicting evidence, the court is author-
ized to instruct the jury that they may find that the fact "continues as long as is usual with
things of that nature." 2 E. DEvITT & C. BLACKMAN, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 71.06, at 132 (2d ed. 1970).
"' See San Antonio v. Timko, 368 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1966); Borror v. Herz, 666 F.2d
569, 573-74 (C.C.P.A. 1981); J. COTCHErr & A. ELKIND, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE 33
(1983); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 57, § 285, at 162. The failure of a party to bring forth
evidence within its control that would tend to prove a disputed fact gives rise to an infer-
ence that the unproduced evidence is unfavorable to that party. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note
57, § 285, at 162.
02 See ITC Investigation, supra note 1, at 32,703. Although the ITC was to consider
evaluative statistics pertaining to the existing health of the affected domestic industry, such
statistics were "distorted by the existence of the order and the reaction of the importers and
exporters to it." Id. at 32,704. Therefore, the ITC stated that its focus was the determina-
tion of the "future behavior of exporters and importers" upon revocation of the antidump-
ing duty order. Id. at 32,705. Thus, it is submitted that the improved strength of the domes-
tic industry while an antidumping duty order is in effect, though likely to be characterized
by the ITC as "changed circumstances," proves little regarding the likelihood of injury fol-
lowing cessation of the order.
03 Id. at 32,705 n.11. The ITC stated that a review investigation differed from a basic
antidumping duty investigation because in a review, the necessary information is "within
the control of the persons petitioning the Commission for a change in the status quo,"
whereas other determinations require evidence from both parties. Id.
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proven fact of material injury and fail to introduce evidence within
their control, the order should stand. It is submitted that the fail-
ure of the Matsushita Court to employ these evidentiary stan-
dards64 resulted in a contravention of both the protective intent
and the remedial purpose of the antidumping laws.
Antidumping laws protect American manufacturers from harm
by forcing foreign industries to sell at competitive prices." An ex-
isting antidumping duty, requiring sales at fair value, aids the
growth of American industry by allowing manufacturers to set
prices according to costs. Thus, it is suggested, the policy underly-
ing the antidumping laws supports the maintenance of a duty in
the absence of clear evidence supporting its removal. The Matsu-
shita Court, by failing to apply the appropriate evidentiary stan-
dards,6 has allowed the television importers to continue their
practice of selling at less-than-fair value,67 thereby undercutting
" See, e.g., Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 857.The Matsushita Court held that, although
the ITC could presume less than fair value sales, the inquiry into the existence of material
injury was to be a "neutral investigation." Id. It is argued that the Court failed to employ
the presumption of the continued existence of material injury to domestic industry, al-
though the injury had been proved in 1971. See supra notes 12 & 61 and accompanying text.
The Court also found that the ITC "could not derive intent ... from a failure by the
proponents of revocation to offer evidence of a lack of intent." 569 F. Supp. at 860. In fact,
the importers offered no evidence regarding their own intentions. ITC Investigation, supra
note 1, at 32,705-06. The Court's determination, it is submitted, contravenes the inference
imposed on a party that fails to introduce evidence exclusively within its dominion and
control. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
11 See 1 R. STURM, supra note 1, § 48.1, at 2; W. WARES, supra note 1, at 21-22. The
protectionist framework of the antidumping laws is apparent in both the statutes and the
regulations. For example, a party that commences a civil action in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade to challenge a determination made by the ITC has the burden of proving that
the decision is wrong. 28 U.S.C. § 2639 (1982). It is submitted that this burden of proof
should also be placed upon a party challenging an ITC determination through an adminis-
trative review.
Federal regulations also evidence the protective purpose of the antidumping laws. Dur-
ing an ITC investigation, assuming a quorum is present, "an evenly divided vote on the
question of injury would result, by operation of law, in an affirmative determination." Voss
Int'l Corp. v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 205, 208 (Cust. Ct. 1977) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979)), modified, 628
F.2d 1328 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The statute construed in Voss was superseded by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, but was adopted as an ITC rule to apply to the review of an out-
standing determination. See 19 C.F.R. § 207.45 (1982). It is submitted that this rule, which
provides that a proponent of revocation of an ITC determination must receive more than
50,% of the votes of the ITC, establishes that the Matsushita plaintiffs did have a burden of
proof during the ITC review.
6 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See Matsushita, 569 F. Supp. at 856. Because the proponents of revocation did not
seek review by the International Trade Administration of the determination that sales were
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the rights of American manufacturers.
CONCLUSION
In Matsushita, the Court of International Trade, in direct
conflict with precedent, substituted its judgment for that of the
ITC. In the future, rather than weigh the evidence, the Court
should remand cases that require further evaluation to the ITC.
Moreover, a burden of production of evidence within a party's con-
trol should be placed on all interested parties in an ITC review
hearing. To align the procedures for review with the antidumping
laws, the ultimate burden of proof should lie with the party advo-
cating review.
EPILOGUE
During the final publication stages of this issue, the decision of
the Court of International Trade in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. United States was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. This opinion is available in slip opinion form at
Nos. 84-693 & -694 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 1984) (available Dec. 20,
1984, LEXIS, Itrade library, Courts file). It is submitted, however,
that the analysis offered in this Comment is not negated by this
reversal, since the Federal Circuit similarly violated the strictures
against weighing the evidence and substituting a judgment.
James D. Herschlein
at less than fair value, the ITC presumed that future sales would be at such value. Id.
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